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We investigate a peculiar intuitionistic modal logic, called Propositional
Lax Logic (PLL), which has promising applications to the formal verifica-
tion of computer hardware. The logic has emerged from an attempt to
express correctness up to behavioural constraintsa central notion in
hardware verificationas a logical modality. As a modal logic it is special
since it features a single modal operator m that has a flavour both of
possibility and of necessity. In the paper we provide the motivation for
PLL and present several technical results. We investigate some of its
proof-theoretic properties, presenting a cut-elimination theorem for a
standard Gentzen-style sequent presentation of the logic. We go on to
define a new class of fallible two-frame Kripke models for PLL. These
models are unusual since they feature worlds with inconsistent informa-
tion; furthermore, the only frame condition imposed is that the m-frame
be a subrelation of the #-frame. We give a natural translation of these
models into Goldblatt’s J-space models of PLL. Our completeness
theorem for these models yields a Go del-style embedding of PLL into a
classical bimodal theory of type (S4, S4) and underpins a simple proof of
the finite model property. We proceed to prove soundness and complete-
ness of several theories for specialized classes of models. We conclude
with a brief exploration of two concrete and rather natural types of model
from hardware verification for which the modality m models correctness
up to timing constraints. We obtain decidability of m-free fragment of the
logic of the first type of model, which coincides with the stable form of
Maksimova’s intermediate logic L6. ] 1997 Academic Press
article no. IC972627
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1. INTRODUCTION
The object of this paper is the rather curious modality m characterized by the
axiom schemes
mR : M#mM
mM : mmM#mM
mS : (mM 7 mN)#m(M7 N)
with the inference rule of Modus Ponens and the rule ‘‘from M#N infer
mM#mN.’’ From a classical point of view the combination of these three axioms
does not make much sense, however innocent each of these axioms may appear.
Indeed, m has a flavour of both possibility and of necessity without being one or
the other. Axioms mR and mM are typical of a modality of possibility h while
mS is typical for necessity g. On the other hand, in standard systems, say Lewis’
modal system S4 (Chellas, 1980), the axiom mR is never adopted for necessity
while mS never for possibility. In fact, if we add the axiom of the Excluded Middle
(EM) and cm false (which is valid for both h and g) to the modal system mR,
mM, mS then m becomes trivial. We can derive both mM#M and M#mM.
In other words, there is no classical Kripke semantics for m. In an intuitionistic
setting, however, the situation is different. There, modal operators like m arise
very naturally in various different ways and under various different names. In the
following let us list some of them in order to motivate the interest in m.
(1) Historically, the earliest appearance of an operator like m may have been
in Curry’s 1948 Notre Dame lectures on A Theory of Formal Deducibility, published
in (Curry, 1957). These lectures contain some sketchy remarks on a modality
endowed with axiom schemata, further refined in (Curry, 1952), that are essentially
equivalent to the ones for m.
(2) Reading implication as an ordering relation, the axioms and rules for m
specify a class of monotone operators that arise in the study of the lattice-theoretic
properties of topological spaces. Such operators were termed nuclei by Simmons
(1978) and Macnab (1981). The algebraic structure of nuclei can be generalized to
the notion of a modal operator on a Heyting algebra (Macnab, 1981). Goldblatt has
shown that these algebras, which he calls local (Heyting) algebras, provide an
appropriate algebraic semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic with a m
modality (Goldblatt, 1981). Goldblatt uses the term geometric modality for m.
The algebraic structure also features in category theory as a generalization of
Grothendieck topologies. There the modal operator m on an Heyting algebra,
usually referred to by the symbol j, becomes a topology on an elementary topos,
and the local algebra becomes an elementary site. The interested reader is referred
to (Goldblatt, 1979).
(3) The algebraic approach essentially characterizes the formal behaviour of
m internally by the way it relates to implication #. However, when one is inter-
ested in m as a logical modality one expects instead to assign external meaning in
terms of truth and validity. So, it is natural to try to extend the standard Kripke
2 FAIRTLOUGH AND MENDLER
File: 643J 262703 . By:DS . Date:06:08:01 . Time:09:30 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 4003 Signs: 3535 . Length: 52 pic 10 pts, 222 mm
semantics for intuitionistic logic to encompass the modality as well. In (Goldblatt,
1981) two such classes of intuitionistic Kripke semantics, called J-spaces and
J-frames, are presented. In these models an underlying Kripke frame is used to
interpret the intuitionistic implication while the modality is interpreted by some
extra data associated with the frame; in the first case this is a notion of neighbour-
hood and in the second case a notion of closeness of worlds. Both notions are con-
ceived to give mM the meaning of ‘‘M is locally true.’’
(4) A different motivation for m can be drawn from general type theory. The
formal properties of m viewed as an unary type constructor give precisely the data
of a strong monad familiar from category theory. In fact, the propositions-as-types
principle which yields an equivalence between the Intuitionistic Propositional
Calculus (IPC) and bi-Cartesian closed categories can be extended to an equiv-
alence between IPC extended by m and bi-Cartesian closed categories with a
strong monad. This categorical structure is also known as the computational
lambda calculus *c (Moggi, 1991). Exploiting this connection strong monads have
found their way into in functional programming; see, e.g., their use in Haskell
(Thompson, 1996). The application of *c as a calculus of proofs has been
investigated by Benton et al. (1995), where the logic of m is called computational
logic (CL).
(5) Our interest in the modality stems from a proof-theoretic interpretation
of m introduced in (Mendler, 1990; Mendler, 1993). It investigates an application
to hardware verification in which the modality m formalizes the notion of correct-
ness up to constraints. The corresponding calculi are called Lax Logics, where the
term ‘‘lax’’ is chosen to indicate the looseness associated with the notion of correct-
ness up to constraints. The intuitive interpretation of mM is ‘‘for some constraint
c, formula M holds under c.’’ Clearly, different notions of constraint will have dif-
ferent properties, and thus will give rise to different axioms for m. The generic
interpretation leads to the three axioms mR, mM, and mS. Axiom mR says ‘‘if M
holds outright then it holds under a (trivial) constraint’’; mM says ‘‘if under some
constraint, M holds under another constraint, then M holds under an appropriately
combined constraint’’; finally, mS says ‘‘if M holds under a constraint, and N holds
under a constraint, then the conjunction M 7 N holds under an appropriately com-
bined constraint.’’ This explains our use of the term Propositional Lax Logic, hence-
forth referred to as PLL, for the logic of m.
(6) As a concrete instance of the constraint reading for m mentioned above
(5), m can be applied to the timing analysis of combinational circuits. One can
establish a direct correspondence between the axioms used in verifying the func-
tional behaviour of a combinational circuit and the computation of data-dependent
timing constraints: mR corresponds to a wire, which involves zero delay 0; mM
deals with the sequential composition of circuits, which involves the addition + of
delays; and mS effects the parallel composition of circuits, which amounts to the
maximum operation max on delays. In other words, by systematic translation of
proofs in PLL into a term over the delay algebra (Nat, 0, +, max), we can extract
verification-driven, and thus data-dependent, timing information. This is essentially
an interpretation, in the sense of (4), in a concrete *c calculus. This idea has been
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worked out in (Mendler, 1996) for a fragment of the logic generated from atomic
sentences and the derived implication M leads to N=df M#mN. Though the delay
algebra (Nat, 0, +, max) may appear rather simple, it is sufficient for a large class
of practical timing analyses for discrete dynamic systems (Baccelli et al., 1992).
The previous remarks indicate that however strange m may appear as a modality
of logic it is a rather natural object well known from other mathematical contexts.
But while its algebraic and type-theoretic ramifications have been investigated its
logical aspects seem to be largely unexplored.
This work stresses the logical view of m and introduces a novel and rather
natural Kripke semantics for m. The models, called constraint models, have two
frame relations; one serves to realize the intuitionistic nature of the logic while the
other is used to interpret the modality. Based on these models we give a full and
faithful embedding of PLL into a classical bimodal theory of type (S4, S4) extend-
ing the well-known Go del translation of intuitionistic logic into S4. This provides
a classical explanation of m in terms of ordinary modalities.
We will use these constraint models towards a model-theoretic study of our read-
ing of m as ‘‘under some constraint,’’ which has been introduced previously only in
a proof-theoretic sense. In this way we hope to convince the reader of an independ-
ent motivation of m from hardware verification. We will give two interesting
subclasses of constraint models obtaining two concrete constraint interpretations
of m. These concrete models, which are related to (intermediate) intuitionistic
logics introduced by Maksimova and Medvedev, verify that PLL has nontrivial
expressiveness and illustrate the value of dropping Excluded Middle and cm false
in concrete cases. We use the structure of the first model to establish the
decidability of the stable form of Maksimova’s logic and suggest applications of
both models in hardware verification.
2. PROPOSITIONAL LAX LOGIC
The formulas of PLL are generated by the grammar
M ::=A | M7 M | M 6 M | M#M | cM | mM
where A ranges over a countably infinite set of propositional constants
pcs=[ p0 , p1 , ...]. We will take # to abbreviate bi-implication and use the derived
constants true and false. It is sometimes convenient to consider false as primitive
and cM as an abbreviation for M#false.
PLL is presented both as a Hilbert and as a Gentzen style calculus. The Hilbert
system of PLL takes as axiom schemata all theorems of (or a complete set of
axioms for) IPC, plus the modal axiom schemata mR, mM, mS. The inference
rules are Modus Ponens and the rule ‘‘from M#N infer mM#mN.’’ The finitary
deduction relation induced by these axioms and rules is denoted by |&PLL . It is also
possible to define PLL as a purely axiomatic extension of IPC.
Lemma 2.1. 1 |&PLL M iff M can be derived in IPC from 1 and the single axiom
schema (N#mK )#(mN#mK ).
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Proof. Let |&+ be the derivation relation obtained from IPC by adding the
scheme (N#mK)#(mN#mK ). One shows that all instances of the three
axioms mR, mM, mS can be derived in |&+, and further that the rule ‘‘from
M#N infer mM#mN ’’ is derivable in the strong form, namely, we have
|&+(M#N )#(mM#mN ). In the other direction it suffices to show that all
instances of (N#mK )#(mN#mK) can be derived in |&PLL. Here
|&PLL(mN#mK )#(N#mK) is a consequence of mR, while for |&PLL(N#mK )#
(mN#mK) one invokes all three axioms mR, mM, and mS. Throughout the
proof one makes use of the fact that all IPC theorems, in particular all substitution
instances containing m, are available. K
Proposition 2.2 (Deduction Theorem). 1, M |&PLL N implies 1 |&PLL M#N.
Proof. The statement follows immediately from the deduction theorem for IPC
(see, e.g., (Dummett, 1977)) and the fact that PLL is an axiomatic extension of
IPC. K
The deduction theorem does not hold for the standard Hilbert presentation of
ordinary modal logics. For instance, in K, T, S4 (Chellas, 1980), we have M |&gM
but |&3 M#gM, and M#N |&hM#hN but |&3 (M#N )#(hM#hN ).
The Gentzen-style calculus for PLL is presented in terms of ordinary sequents
1 |&2, where 1 is a finite, possibly empty, list of hypotheses and 2 a finite list of
assertions with length 0 or 1. The complete set of our sequent rules is listed in
Fig. 1. The inference rules for deriving sequents are the standard ones for IPC plus
two special rules mR and mL which capture the properties of m:
1 |&M
1 |&mM
mR
1, M |&mN
1, mM |&mN
mL.
These rules are the ones suggested by (Curry, 1957), and may be seen as a sequent-
style version of the natural deduction system for m used in (Mendler, 1993). The
rules have independently been considered by (Benton et al., 1995). There are other
alternative formalizations of PLL; e.g., a tableau calculus has been investigated in
(Avellone and Ferrari, 1996).
Theorem 2.3. The Hilbert and Gentzen systems for PLL are equivalent; i.e., for
all formulas M, |&PLL M iff |&M is derivable.
Proof. One proves a stronger theorem, showing that when 1 is finite and 2
contains at most one formula, the sequent 1 |&2 is derivable iff 1 |&PLL  2,
where  2=M if 2=[M], and  <=false. Both directions can be established by
induction on derivations. K
Theorem 2.4 (Strong Conservativity). Let M be a theorem of PLL. Then the
formula M$, where M$ is obtained from M by removing all occurrences of m, is a
theorem of IPC.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivations one shows that if 1 |&M
then 1 $ |&M$. K
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FIG. 1. Gentzen rules for PLL.
Another way of turning theorems of PLL into theorems of IPC is obtained by
replacing all sub-formulas prefixed by m by true. Both results are special instances
of the more general result that the translation mM#C#M preserves provability;
for the first take C#true and for the second take C#false. From the latter transla-
tion we may conclude, for instance, that c mfalse and (from the general transla-
tion) that m(M 6N )#(mM6 mN ) are not theorems of PLL. This ensures that
PLL is nontrivial extension of IPC, in the sense that it is not possible to transform
a theorem of IPC into a theorem of PLL by arbitrarily introducing ms.
Theorem 2.5 (Strong Extensionality). PLL is strongly extensional; i.e., the
scheme (M#N )#(C[M]#C[N]) is admissible, where C[] is an arbitrary
syntactic context and M, N arbitrary formulas.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of C[]. The interesting case,
of course, is when C[]=m[]. But |& (M#N )#(mM#mN ) may be derived
easily using rules mL and mR (of the Gentzen calculus). K
Theorem 2.6 (Cut Elimination). If |&2 is derivable, then it is derivable without
the cut rule.
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FIG. 2. Additional primitive cut reduction step.
Proof. The proof uses the same method that works for IPC (Dummett, 1977).
One new reduction step needs to be introduced, as shown in Fig. 2. Cut elimination
has been proven independently by (Benton et al., 1995). K
Direct consequences of cut-elimination are the disjunction property, the sub-
formula property, and the admissibility of the rule ‘‘from mM infer M,’’ which is
the inverse of the necessitation rule of standard modal logics.
Lemma 2.7.
(i) |&PLL M 6 N implies |&PLL M or |&PLL N
(ii) |&PLL mM implies |&PLL M
(iii) If 1 |&2 is derivable, then there exists a derivation which involves only
sub-formulas of 1 and 2.
From the sub-formula property (iii) we get the decidability of PLL. This theorem
is proven in (Goldblatt, 1981) by semantic methods.
Theorem 2.8 (Decidability). PLL is decidable.
We have seen that PLL combines a number of properties (in particular, the
deduction theorem and the interpretation mM=true) which are rather strong for
a modal logic. Although from a formal point of view every unary syntactic operator
may be called a ‘‘modality’’ one wonders whether the proof-theoretic properties of
m are not in fact too strong for it to be an interesting modality in a semantic sense.
It turns out that m indeed can be given a proper and nontrivial semantics in terms
of Kripke models. One necessary condition on a satisfactory notion of Kripke
model, of course, is that is should explain the modality m in terms of a correspond-
ing semantic accessibility relation. In the following section we present one such type
of model.
2. CONSTRAINT MODELS FOR PLL
Kripke-style analyses have been given for other intuitionistic modal logics, for
instance by Simpson (1994) and Plotkin and Stirling (1986) for system IK, by
Fischer-Servi (1980) for the class of (V)-IC systems, and by Ewald (1986) for an
intuitionistic tense logic. The approach taken here most closely follows (Plotkin
and Stirling, 1986) in using one set of worlds but two separate frame relations to
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interpret m and #. This satisfies our requirement that m be given a Kripke-style
interpretation. As a result of our approach we obtain a full and faithful embedding
of PLL into a classical bimodal (S4, S4) theory. This gives a classical account of
PLL which extends the well-known Go del embedding of IPC and is different from
the embedding of intuitionistic modal logics suggested by Fischer-Servi (1980). A
quite different kind of semantics was given by Goldblatt (1981), in which only the
intuitionistic part # is represented by a frame relation, while the modality is
realized by some extra topological information on the intuitionistic frame.
Definition 3.1 (Kripke Constraint Model). A (Kripke) constraint model for
PLL is a quintuple C=(W, Rm , Ri , V, F ), where W is a non-empty set, Rm , Ri are
binary relations on W, FW, and V is a map that assigns to every propositional
constant A of PLL a subset V(A)W. These data are subject to the following
conditions:
v Rm , Ri are preorders, i.e., reflexive and transitive relations, and RmRi ,
v F and V are hereditary w.r.t. Ri , i.e. if w Ri v, then w # F implies v # F, and
w # V(A) implies v # V(A),
v V is full on F, i.e., FV(A).
If w Rm v then we say that v is a constraining of w, or v is reachable from w under
a constraint. Elements of F are fallible worlds and if w Rm v and v # F, then
intuitively the constraint leading to v is inconsistent with world w. Models with
fallible worlds are not a new concept. They have been introduced previously to
admit intuitionistic meta-theory for intuitionistic logic; see, e.g., (Troelstra and van
Dalen, 1988; Dummett, 1977). As we will show later on, in our context, fallible
worlds arise naturally from the constraint interpretation.
Definition 3.2 (Validity). Let C=(W, Rm , Ri , V, F ) be a constraint model for
PLL. Given a formula M and w # W, M is valid at w in C, written C, w < M iff
v M is a propositional constant A and w # V(A);
v M is N 7 K and both C, w < N and C, w < K;
v M is N 6 K and C, w < N or C, w < K;
v M is true, or M is false and w # F;
v M is N#K and for all v # W such that w Ri v, C, v < N implies C, v < K;
v M is of form mN and for all v # W, w Ri v, there exists u # W with v Rm u
such that C, u < N.
A formula M is valid in C, written C < M, if for all w # W, M is valid at w in C;
M is valid, written < M, if M is valid in any constraint model C.
Disregarding the fallible worlds, for modal-free formulas validity is defined
exactly as for intuitionistic logic on the underlying frame (W, Ri , V ). Validity
behaves as in ordinary intuitionistic logic; viz., it is hereditary with respect to the
accessibility relations. Formally, if w < M and w Ri v, then v < M. This is due to
the transitivity of Ri . Since Rm is a subrelation of Ri , validity is hereditary with
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respect to Rm too. Worlds w, v with w Ri v and v Ri w validate the same formulas
and can thus be identified. Hence, it is no restriction to assume that the relation Ri
is a partial order, i.e., antisymmetric. Note that m is hereditary w.r.t. the intui-
tionistic frame Ri without further imposing a confluence frame condition as in the
models for IK (Plotkin and Stirling, 1986).
Some remarks concerning our definition of validity are in order. Observe that the
clause for validity of mN is a \_ statement. This endows m with properties of both
possibility and of necessity. Second, one notes that fallible worlds validate all for-
mulas and that cmfalse is not valid in general. Also, our semantics of m does not
validate the scheme m(M 6 N )#mM 6mN, a fact that is important if the seman-
tics is to capture the proof-theoretic properties of PLL. Both this scheme and
cmfalse are generally adopted for modality h, even for intuitionistic logics such
as IK and apparently also by the class (V)-IC of logics considered by Fischer-Servi
in (Fischer-Servi, 1980). We will present concrete constraint models falsifying as
well as validating these axioms. Finally, notice that there is no point in defining a
‘‘necessity’’ modality, in contrast to IK. Its definition
w < gM iff \v, u. w Ri v 6 v Rm u O u < M
yields nothing new because of the frame condition RmRi .
Theorem 3.3 (Soundness). If |&PLL M then < M.
Proof. We lift the notion of validity to sequents in the following way: A sequent
1 |&K is valid in model C if for all w, whenever all hypotheses M # 1 are valid at
w in C, then the assertion K is valid at w in C; a sequent 1 |& is valid in C if the
only worlds at which all hypotheses M # 1 are valid in C are fallible worlds.
One then shows by induction on derivations that if 1 |&2 is derivable then 1 |&2
is valid in all models. The hereditariness of validity, and thus transitivity of Ri and
inclusion RmRi , is used for the rules #R, cR, mR, and mL. The reflexivity of
Ri is used to show soundness of #L, cL, mL. Finally, the reflexivity of Rm is
exploited for mR, and the transitivity of Rm for mL. K
Other types of models for PLL are the J-frames and J-spaces of Goldblatt
(1981). Just as in our work, these models are built on an intuitionistic frame
(W, Ri). However, they do not have fallible worlds F and in place of our modal
frame relation Rm some topological structure on (W, Ri) is used. We will now give
a rather natural semantics-preserving translation of constraint models into J-spaces,
that preserves the underlying intuitionistic frame. The other direction and the con-
nection with J-frames, which are not considered here, are left as open problems.
We first recall the definitions given in (Goldblatt, 1981). An intuitionistic Kripke
model (IKM) is a triple (W, Ri , V ) where W is a nonempty set, Ri a partial order-
ing on W, and V a valuation, i.e., an assignment of hereditary subsets of W to
propositional constants.
Definition 3.4. An J-space is given by an IKM S=(W, Ri , V ) together with
a map # that assigns to every w # W a collection #(w)2W of Ri-hereditary subsets
of W, with the following properties:
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(N1) w Ri v implies #(w)#(v)
(N2) R # #(w) and S # #(w) implies R & S # #(w)
(N3) R # #(w) and S a Ri -hereditary subset of W such that RS imply
S # #(w)
(N4) [w)=[v | w Ri v] # #(w)
(N5) For any Ri -hereditary subset SW, if [v | S # #(v)] # #(w), then
S # #(w).
Strictly, in (Goldblatt, 1981) the term J-space is applied only to the underlying
structure (W, Ri , #) not including the valuation V. For modal-free formulas validity
on J-spaces, denoted by <s , is defined just like that for intuitionistic logic, on the
underlying IKM. Validity for formulas mM is given by the clause
w <s mM iff _S # #(w). \v # S. v <s N.
Remark. Condition (N1) is to ensure hereditariness of validity. (N2) deals with
the axiom mM 7mN#m(M 7 N ), (N3) with the rule that |&M#N entails
|&mM#mN, (N4) is for the axiom M#mM, and finally (N5) ensures validity of
mmM#mM.
Theorem 3.5. Let C=(W, Ri , Rm , F, V ) be a non-trivial constraint model (i.e.,
one where W{F ) and let (W 0, R0i , V
0) be the underlying non-fallible IKM obtained
from (W, Ri , V ) by restriction to the set W"F. Then, there exists # such that
S=(W 0, R0i , #, V
0) is a J-space such that for all M,
C < M iff S <s M.
Proof. A subset SW is called Rm-cofinal for w # W iff S is Ri-hereditary and
for all u # W such that w Ri u, there exists a v # S with u Rm v. In other words, S is
Rm-cofinal for w if from every Ri-reachable successor of w the set S is Rm-reachable.
For all w # W 0 we take #(w) to be the set of all Rm-cofinal sets for w, restricted to
W 0. We leave it to the reader to check the properties (N1)(N5) and preservation
of truth, i.e., that for all w # W 0, C, w < M iff S, w <s M. K
4. COMPLETENESS
In this section we prove completeness of PLL with respect to Kripke constraint
models. If we had a method of translating Goldblatt’s J-spaces into equivalent
constraint models, then completeness for constraint models would follow
immediately from the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Goldblatt). |&PLL M iff M is valid on all J-spaces.
Rather than searching for such a translation of models we give a separate com-
pleteness proof. We follow the standard idea of constructing a counter model
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for every formula that is not derivable. The counter model employs a suitable
generalization of the Lindenbaum construction, in which worlds are triples
(1, 2, 3)
of sets of formulas, called theories, subject to an abstract consistency condition
which reflects the semantic role of the components (cf. (Fitting, 1983)).
The model will be set up so that in a world w=(1, 2, 3) the formulas in 1 are
validated at w, the formulas in 2 are falsified at w, and the formulas in 3 are
falsified at every world Rm-reachable from w. The sets 3 are a special feature of our
completeness proof and of PLL. They are introduced to make up for the fact that
falsity of a formula mM cannot be expressed by including M (or a sub-formula of
M) in 1 or 2. We need to keep track of these separately.
Another special feature of the proof is the notion of consistency. A theory
(1, 2, 3) is consistent if for every choice of formulas N1 , ..., Nn # 2, and
K1 , ..., Kk # 3, such that n+k1, it is not the case that
1 |&N1 6 } } } 6 Nn 6 m(K1 6 } } } 6 Kk).
This definition is somewhat weaker than one might expect as it excludes the case
k=n=0. The disjunction on the right must always be nonempty, with the effect
that the theories (1, <, <), for any choice of 1, are consistent for trivial reasons.
The point here is that we take the empty disjunction to be the empty formula rather
than false.
A consistent theory is maximally consistent if there is no proper consistent exten-
sion, under component-wise subset ordering. For instance, the distinguished theory
(=, <, <), where = denotes the set of all formulas, is maximally consistent.
Observe that if (1, 2, 3) is maximally consistent, then false # 1 iff 2=3=<.
Lemma 4.2.
v Every consistent theory has a maximally consistent extension.
v If (1, 2, 3) is a maximally consistent theory then the following properties
hold:
(i) 1 is deductively closed
(ii) If M 6 N # 1 then M # 1 or N # 1
(iii) If M#N # 1 then M # 2 or N # 1
(iv) If M 6 N # 2 then M # 2 and N # 2
(v) If M 7 N # 2 then M # 2 or N # 2
(vi) 32
(vii) M # 1 iff M  2.
Proof. Let (1, 2, 3) be a consistent theory. We obtain a maximally consistent
extension (1*, 2*, 3*) in the usual way by enumerating all formulas
B0 , B1 , ..., Bn , Bn+1 , ...
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and by building up a hierarchy of consistent theories
(10 , 20 , 30)(11 , 21 , 31) } } } (1n , 2n , 3n)(1n+1 , 2n+1 , 3n+1) } } }
starting with (10 , 20 , 30)=(1, 2, 3) and such that (1n+1 , 2n+1 , 3n+1)=
(1n _ [Bn], 2n , 3n) if it is consistent, otherwise (1n+1 , 2n+1 , 3n+1)=
(1n , 2n _ [Bn], 3n _ [Bn]) if it is consistent, otherwise (1n+1 , 2n+1 , 3n+1)=
(1n , 2n _ [Bn], 3n). Then
(1*, 2*, 3*) =df \ .n # | 1n , .n # | 2n , .n # | 3n+ .
(1*, 2*, 3*) is a maximally consistent theory. Note that if 1 |&false, then by con-
sistency of (1, 2, 3) we must have 2=3=<, in which case the above construc-
tion will produce the maximally consistent extension (=, <, <).
The second part of the lemma is not hard to verify. It uses the properties of the
sequent calculus for |&, in particular the two derived rules
1 |& X6 m  Y
1 |& X$6 m  Y$
XX$ and YY$
1 |&M6 N 1, M |&N
1 |&N
In the first rule X$, Y$ are finite sets of formulas and  [M1 , ..., Mn] abbreviates
M1 6 } } } 6 Mn . When Z is empty then the corresponding disjunct  Z in the first
rule is dropped. The second rule is derivable from the structural rules (in particular
the cut rule), 6L, and id, whereas the first one also involves 6R1 , 6R2 , mR, and
mL. The application of both these derived rules, as well as the structural rules, will
be referred to as ‘‘structural reasoning’’ in the following. The seven claims in the
second part of the lemma are now handled as follows:
(i) If 1 |&M and M  1, then by maximality 1, M |& 2$ 6m  3$ for
some finite subsets 2$2 and 3$3. By structural reasoning this implies
1 |& 2$ 6m  3$, contradicting the consistency of (1, 2, 3). The remaining
cases follow a similar pattern.
(ii) If neither M nor N are members of 1, then (1 _ [M], 2, 3) and
(1 _ [N], 2, 3) are inconsistent, by maximality. Thus, for some 2M , 2N2
and 3M , 3N3, we get associatedlet us call them the ‘‘maximality’’proofs
for 1, M |& 2M 6 m  3M and 1, N |& 2N 6m  3N . Applying structural
reasoning and the 6 L rule to the associated maximality proofs, we obtain the
inconsistency of (1 _ [M 6 N], 2, 3), and hence M6 N  1.
(iii) If M  2 and N  1 we apply structural reasoning and the #L rule to the
associated maximality proofs to establish the inconsistency of (1 _ [M#N], 2, 3).
(iv) If M  2 or N  2, we may apply structural reasoning and 6R1 or
6R2 to the associated maximality proofs to establish the inconsistency of
(1, 2 _ [M 6 N], 3); we might boil this argument down to the even more compact
formulation ‘‘by maximality and 6R1 .’’
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(v) Follows by maximality and 7R.
(vi) Follows by maximality and the theorem K 6 mL#m(K 6L).
(vii) Follows by maximality. K
We can now proceed to define a generic Kripke constraint model
C*=(W*, R*m , Ri*, V*, F*)
which falsifies all unprovable formulas. As the elements in W* we take the maxi-
mally consistent theories T=(1, 2, 3). The accessibility relation Ri* is simply the
subset relation on the first component, i.e.,
(1, 2, 3) Ri* (1 $, 2$, 3$) #
df
11 $,
and constraint accessibility R*m is the subset relation in the first and third compo-
nent:
(1, 2, 3) R*m (1 $, 2$, 3$) #
df
11 $ and 33$.
Valuation V* and fallible nodes F* are defined so that
V*(A) #
df
[(1, 2, 3) | A # 1]
F* #
df
[(=, <, <)].
It is not hard to verify that these data indeed constitute a constraint Kripke model.
The following properties make C* a canonical model for PLL:
Lemma 4.3. Let T=(1, 2, 3) be a maximally consistent theory. Then,
v M # 1 implies T < M
v M # 2 implies T <3 M
v M # 3 implies that for all T$ such that T R*m T$, T$ <3 M.
Proof. The lemma is proved by induction on the formula M. Here only the
cases M#mN and M#N#K will be treated, as they are the ones that drive the
model along Ri* and R*m . All other cases are achieved on-the-spot using Lemma 4.2.
It will be convenient to express the consistency condition for theories (1, 2, 3)
in more concise but less precise form as
1 |&3 PLL  2 6 m  3,
noting that if the right hand side is the empty formula then the statement is trivially
true.
v Suppose mN # 1 and T1 is such that T Ri* T1 . Then T1=(11 , 21 , 31) and
111 . We consider the theory (11 _ [N], <, 31). We claim that this theory is
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consistent. Assume otherwise; then we must have 11 , N |&PLL m  31 and further
by the deduction theorem, 11 |&PLL N#m  31. Since we can prove
\N#m  31+#\mN#m  31+
in PLL (by Lemma 2.1) we conclude that 11 , mN |&PLL m  31. But since
mN # 111 this contradicts the consistency of T1 . By Lemma 4.2 we can now find
a maximally consistent extension T$=(1 $, 2$, 3$) of (11 _ [N], <, 31). By defini-
tion, T1 R*m T$, and by the induction hypothesis on N, T$ < N. Thus we have
T < mN.
v Suppose mN # 2. Consider the theory (1, <, [N]), which must be consis-
tent for otherwise 1 |&PLL mN, which contradicts consistency of T. Now take a
maximally consistent extension T$=(1 $, 2$, 3$) of (1, <, [N]). We claim that for
all T1 with T$ R*m T1 , T1 <3 N. Let T1=(11 , 21 , 31). By construction of T$ and
definition of R*m, N # 3$31 . By induction hypothesis on N, T1 <3 N. This com-
pletes the proof that T <3 mN.
v Suppose N#K # 1 and T1=(11 , 21 , 31) such that T Ri* T1 . By definition
of Ri*, N#K # 111 . By Lemma 4.2(iii) we have N # 21 or K # 11 . By induction
hypothesis we infer that if T1 < N then T1 < K. Thus, T < N#K.
v Suppose N#K # 2. Consider the theory (1 _ [N], [K], <). It must be
consistent since otherwise 1, N |&PLL K, whence by the deduction theorem
1 |&PLL N#K which contradicts consistency of T. Now take a maximally consis-
tent extension T$=(1 $, 2$, 3$) of (1 _ [N], [K], <). We have T Ri* T$, N # 1 $,
and K # 2$. By induction hypothesis, T$ < N and T$ <3 K. But this means
T <3 N#K.
v To prove the last statement of the lemma the cases M # 3 are all treated in
the same way: suppose M # 3 and T1=(11 , 21 , 31) such that T R*m T1 . By defini-
tion of R*m and the properties of maximally consistent theories, Lemma 4.2(vi),
M # 3/31/21 . Thus, we can appeal to the proofs above to conclude that
T1 <3 M. K
Theorem 4.4 (Completeness). If < M then |&PLL M.
Proof. Suppose |&3 PLL M. Then (<, [M], <) is consistent. By Lemma 4.2 there
is a maximally consistent extension T, and by Lemma 4.3 T <3 M in the constraint
Kripke model C*. K
Three examples of counter models, one falsifying cmfalse, one falsifying
m(A 6 B)#(mA 6 mB), and one falsifying < (mA#mB)#m(A#B), are
shown in Fig. 3, where the dashed arrows represent Ri and the solid arrows Rm .
In Section 6 we will discuss special cases of concrete constraint models validating
the axiom schemes cmfalse and m(M6 N)#(mM 6 mN ). It turns out that
these classes can be characterized as follows:
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FIG. 3. Three counter models.
Theorem 4.5.
v PLL+cmfalse is sound and complete for the class of constraint models with
F=<.
v PLL+m(M 6 N )#(mM 6mN ) is sound and complete for the class of con-
straint models where Rm and Ri are mutually confluent, i.e. if x Rm w and x Ri v, then
there exists u such that w Ri u and v Rm u.
Proof. Soundness of cmfalse is obvious if F=<. Soundness of the second
axiom perhaps is not so obvious. For mutually confluent frame relations one first
proves by induction on the structure of M that for all worlds w,
w < mM iff _u. w Rm u and u < M.
From this soundness of m(M6 N)#(mM 6mN ) then follows directly.
The proof of completeness in both cases is obtained by simple specialization of
the completeness proof for PLL (Theorem 4.4).
v Suppose M is not derivable in PLL+cmfalse. Then the theory
([cmfalse], [M], <) is consistent and thus we can find a maximally consistent
theory T=(1, 2, 3) so that cmfalse # 1 and M # 2. We know that T <3 M in
the sub-model of C* generated by all theories T$ such that T Ri* T$. Though
being a counter model for M it does contain the fallible theory (=, <, <) and thus
is not of the desired form. However, one can show that by throwing out (=, <, <)
from the (counter) model we do not change validity of any formula. A sufficient
condition for this is that (=, <, <) cannot be accessed by R*m . In fact, one
shows that cmfalse # 1 and (1, 2, 3) R*m (1 $, 2$, 3$) implies false  1 $. For
assume otherwise; then (1 $, 2$, 3$)=(=, <, <), whence by definition of R*m
we have 3=<. Since (1, 2, 3) is maximally consistent this implies that
1 |&PLL  2 6 mfalse since the proper extension (1, 2, [ false]) cannot be consis-
tent. Now we use the assumption that cmfalse # 1 (and the properties of deduc-
tion in the logic) to conclude that 1 |&PLL  2 which contradicts the consistency of
(1, 2, 3). Thus, from the assumption that M is not a theorem of PLL+cmfalse
we can construct a model without fallible nodes in which M is falsified. This proves
the completeness statement for PLL+cmfalse.
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v Suppose that M is not derivable in PLL+m(X 6 Y )#(mX 6mY ). Again
we consider the canonical counter model generated by a maximally consistent
theory T=(1, 2, 3) such that M # 2 and such that 1 contains all substitution
instances of the axiom scheme m(X 6 Y )#(mX 6 mY ). We are done if we can
show that in the sub-model given by the maximally consistent theories (1 $, 2$, 3$)
with 11 $, Ri* and R*m are mutually confluent. The first step is to observe that
both 2$ and 3$ are uniquely determined by 1 $,
2$=\ (1 $) and 3$=$2$,
where \ (1 $) is the complement of 1 $ and $2$=[N | mN # 2$]. The first part was
proven already in Lemma 4.2. The second part is a consequence of the extra axioms
in 1 $ and seen as follows. Let K # $2$, i.e., mK # 2$, but K  3$. Then, since
(1 $, 2$, 3$) is maximally consistent, we get 1 $ |&PLL  2$ 6 m( 3$ 6 K ). Now, by
assumption, 1 $ contains the axiom m( 3$ 6K )#m  3$ 6 mK, whence from
both facts together we get 1 $ |&PLL  2$ 6 mK 6 m  3$ which contradicts con-
sistency of (1 $, 2$, 3$). Thus, $2$3$. The other direction is obtained similarly,
using the fact that (mN 6 mK )#m(N 6 K ) is derivable in PLL.
The second step is to observe that (1 $, 2$, 3$) R*m (1", 2", 3") is equivalent to
the condition 1 $1"$1 $. Assume 1 $1"$1 $. Then 3$=$2$=$(\ (1 $))=
$$(\ (1 $))=$(\ ($1 $))$(\ (1"))=$2"=3", where the equation $$X=$X holds
generally for all deductively closed sets X, by virtue of the rule mM. Thus,
(1 $, 2$, 3$) R*m (1", 2", 3"). Vice versa, if (1 $, 2$, 3$) R*m (1", 2", 3") we have
1 $1" and 1"\ (3")\ (3$)=\ ($2$)=$(\ (2$))=$1 $.
Now we can prove mutual confluence. Suppose we are given three maximally
consistent theories (1 $, 2$, 3$), (11 , 21 , 31), and (12 , 22 , 32) such that
11 $ & 11 & 12 and such that
(1 $, 2$, 3$) Ri* (11 , 21 , 31) and (1 $, 2$, 3$) R*m (12 , 22 , 32).
We need to find a T$ such that (11 , 21 , 31) R*m T$ and (12 , 22 , 32) Ri* T$.
We claim that any maximally consistent extension T$ of the theory ($11 , <, 31)
will do. For such a T$ to exist ($11 , <, 31) must be consistent. Suppose it is
not, then $11 |&PLL m  31 which, by the properties of the logic, implies
that 11 |&PLL m  31 contradicting consistency of (11 , 21 , 31). Thus, let
T$=(13 , 23 , 33) be a maximally consistent extension of ($11 , <, 31). One verifies
11$1113 and 3133 , hence (11 , 21 , 31) R*m T$ as desired. Further, 12$1 $
by the second observation above and thus 12$1 $$1113 . Thus,
(12 , 22 , 32) Ri* T$, which completes the proof that the presence of the axioms
m(X 6 Y )#(mX6 mY ) forces R*m and Ri* in the canonical model to be mutually
confluent. K
Our proof of completeness is classical, i.e., nonconstructive. It does not yield an
effective method of constructing a counter model for unprovable sequents.
However, from the work of Avellone and Ferrari (1996), which uses a different,
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tableau-based presentation of PLL, it is clear that a constructive proof of complete-
ness for our constraint models is possible. In fact, PLL has the finite model
property for our class of constraint models.
Theorem 4.6 (Finite Model Property). |&PLL M iff C < M for all finite con-
straint models C.
Proof. Soundness is obvious. Completeness hinges on the fact that, as in intui-
tionistic logic, the validity or refutation of a formula M at a given world w of a
constraint model only depends on the validity or refutation of all of its proper sub-
formulas at w and at all v that are Ri -reachable from w. So, at each world, only a
finite amount of information is relevant for M. Using this one can devise a suitable
quotient (filtration) of a given counter model for M, that preserves the refutation
of M but has only a finite number of elements.
Concretely, let Sf(M) be the set of subformulas of M (we consider false as a sub-
formula of every formula), and let C=(W, Ri , Rm , V, F ) be a refutation model
for M. In our constraint models two kinds of information are relevant to a given
world w. First, as in the intuitionistic case, we need to preserve the set T(w) of sub-
formulas that are validated at w, i.e., the set
T(w) :=[N # Sf(M) | w < N].
Second, we need to preserve the set of subformulas that are refuted on all Rm-
reachable successors of w, i.e., the set
Fm(w) :=[N # Sf(M) | \v. w Rm v O v <3 N].
This part of the information captures the semantic behaviour of the modality m.
We then define an equivalence relation on W as follows:
w#v iff T(w)=T(v) and Fm(w)=Fm(v).
Since Sf(M) is finite it is clear that there are only a finite number of equivalence
classes [w]# . We now define the filtration model
C#=(W |# , Ri | # , Rm |# , V |# , F | #)
over the set W |# of equivalence classes by stipulating [w]# Ri | # [v]# iff
T(w)T(v); [w]# Rm |# [v]# iff T(w)T(v) and Fm(w)Fm(v); [w]# # V#(A)
iff A  Sf(M) or w # V(A); [w]# # F |# iff w # F. One verifies that this construction
yields a well-defined finite constraint model that validates exactly the same M-sub-
formulas as C. Thus, if |&3 PLL M we can apply this filtration to the canonical counter
model C* constructed in the proof of the completeness Theorem 4.4 to get a finite
counter model C* |# for M. K
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5. EMBEDDING OF PLL IN CLASSICAL MODAL LOGIC
It is well known that intuitionistic logic can be encoded in the classical modal
logic S4 using Go del’s translation (Go del, 1932). In fact, the completeness of intui-
tionistic logic for the standard intuitionistic Kripke semantics can be seen as a
corollary of the faithfulness of Go del’s translation. The main result of this section
is to show that for the intuitionistic modal logic PLL too a faithful translation into
classical modal logic can be obtained from the Kripke semantics presented in the
previous section. We shall embed PLL into a classical bimodal theory of type
(S4, S4).
Classical bimodal logic has the usual propositional connectives together with two
dual pairs of modalities gi , hi , gm , hm . A bimodal model is a Kripke structure
M=(W, Rm , Ri , V ) where W is a nonempty set, Ri , Rm are binary relations on W,
and V is a map that assigns to every propositional constant A a subset V(A)W.
The notion of validity in bimodal models is as usual and assumed to be understood
(see, e.g., (Popkorn, 1994)).
A bimodal logic of type (S4, S4) has as axioms the standard propositional ones
plus the modal schemes
Ti : gi M#M Tm : gmM#M
4i : gi M#gigi M 4m : gmM#gm gmM
Ki : gi (M#N)#giM#giN Km : gm(M#N)#gmM#gm N
and Modus Ponens together with necessitation
|&M O |&giM |&M O |&gm M
as rules of inference. As usual the necessity modalities gi , gm are taken as
primitive and the possibilities are introduced as their classical duals, i.e., hiM=
cgi cM and hmM=cgm cM. The bimodal theory we are interested in is
obtained from bimodal logic of type (S4, S4) by adding the axiom scheme
Sub : gi M#gmM.
The resulting theory we denote by [S4, S4], where the square brackets are meant
to indicate the presence of the axiom Sub. A [S4, S4]-model is a bimodal model
M=(W, Rm , Ri , V ), where Ri , Rm are reflexive, transitive, and satisfy RmRi . It
is straightforward to show from results in (Popkorn, 1994) that the theory [S4, S4]
is sound and (Kripke) complete for the class of [S4, S4]-models.
Let f be a distinguished propositional constant in the following. We translate
every formula M of PLL into a bimodal formula M g as follows:
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false g=gi f
A g=gi (A 6 f )
(M 7 N ) g=M g 7 N g
(M 6 N ) g=M g 6 N g
(M#N ) g=gi (M g#N g)
(mM) g=gi hm M g,
where A ranges over propositional constants.
Theorem 5.1. Let M be a formula of PLL that does not contain the propositional
constant f. Then, |&PLL M iff [S4, S4] |&M g.
Proof. The theorem is a direct consequence of soundness and completeness of
the respective logics, and the close relationship between their models. There is a
natural way to translate both types of models into each other preserving the
validity of formulas. All we need to do is to translate the valuation part, the
bimodal structure remains the same.
(O) Let M=(W, Rm , Ri , V ) be a [S4, S4]-model and Mg=(W, Rm , Ri ,
Vg , Fg) the induced Kripke constraint model with Vg(A)=[w # W | \v # W.
w Ri v O v # V(A) _ V( f )] and Fg=Vg( f ). We prove by structural induction that
for all formulas M of PLL that do not contain f,
M, w < M g  Mg , w < M,
where < on the left is classical validity in [S4, S4]-models, while < on the right
is intuitionistic validity in constraint models. From this it follows that if M is valid
in all constraint models then M g is valid in all [S4, S4]-models. Hence, by com-
pleteness of [S4, S4], |&PLL M implies [S4, S4] |&M g.
v M, w < false g iff M, w < gi f iff \v. w Ri v O M, v < f, iff w # Vg( f ) iff
Mg , w < false.
v M, w < A g iff M, w < gi (A 6 f ) iff w # Vg(A) iff Mg , w < A.
v Conjunction M7 N and disjunction M 6 N present no difficulties.
v M, w < (M#N ) g iff M, w < g i (M g#N g). This is equivalent to the
statement that for all v with w Ri v, M, v < M g implies M, v < N g. By induction
hypothesis this is equivalent to Mg , v < M implies Mg , v < N. Hence,
M, w < (M#N ) g is equivalent to Mg , w < M#N.
v M, w < (mM) g iff M, w < g ihmM g. Using the induction hypothesis for
M, this is readily seen to be the same as the statement Mg , w < mM.
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(o) Let C=(W, Rm , Ri , V, F ) be a constraint model and Cg=
(W, Rm , Ri , V g) the induced [S4, S4]-model obtained by putting Vg(A)=V(A) if
A{ f and Vg( f )=F. We claim that for all formulas M that do not contain f,
C, w < M  Cg, w < M g.
From this it follows that if M g is valid in all [S4, S4]-models then M is valid in
all constraint models, which by completeness of PLL means that [S4, S4] |&M g
implies |&PLL M.
v C, w < false iff w # F. By hereditariness of F this is equivalent to
\v. w Ri v O v # F which is the same as Cg, w < false g since by definition Vg( f )=F
and false g=gi f.
v We only need to consider propositional constants A different from f.
Cg, w < A g iff Cg, w < gi (A6 f ). Since V g(A) _ Vg( f )=V(A) _ F=V(A), this is
equivalent to the statement that for all v with w Ri v, v # V(A), which by hereditari-
ness of V(A) is the same as C, w < A.
v Again, conjunction M7 N and disjunction M 6 N are trivial.
v Cg, w < (M#N ) g iff Cg, w < g i (M g#N g). Using the induction
hypothesis for M, N this is nothing but the semantic condition for C, w < M#N.
v Cg, w < (mM) g iff Cg, w < gihmM g. Again, with reference to the induc-
tion hypothesis, this is equivalent to the semantic condition for C, w < mM. K
Theorem 5.1 gives a classical account of PLL by a simple bimodal variant of the
Go del translation. This is an interesting result which falls out directly from the spe-
cial structure of our constraint models, viz., their essentially bimodal nature.
Note how falsity (and hence negation) of PLL is captured in the translated classi-
cal formula with the help of a distinguished propositional constant f. This trick is
borrowed from Johansson who used it to embed intuitionistic logic into minimal
logic (Johansson, 1936). The naive translation false g=false would not be faith-
ful, since then (cmfalse) g=gi cgihm false, which is a theorem of [S4, S4],
while cmfalse is not a theorem of PLL. Observe also that the requirement that
f not appear in M is crucial: For instance, f #A is not valid in PLL but
( f #A) g=gi (gi f #gi (A 6 f )) is valid in [S4, S4].
6. SOME ABSTRACT CONSTRAINT MODELS
We give two variants of concrete models for PLL. The first class of models, dis-
cussed in this section, is characterized by formulas of the kind mM#C[M] where
C[] is one of a family of possible contexts, for example C1[M]#C#M, where C
is a fixed proposition. As mentioned this is precisely Curry’s system LJZ (Curry,
1952) and a special case of the quite general constraint interpretation according to
which mM means ##M, where # is taken from a predefined set of distinguished
propositions representing constraints. Other possible contexts are C2[M]#C 6 M
or C3[M]#(M#C )#C. These three contexts Ci[] are closely related to the
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modal operators v, u, and w considered by Simmons (1978) and Macnab (1981),
which have a distinguished status in the algebraic theory. Here we give a constraint
interpretation and characterization in terms of constraint models, albeit in case of
C3[] only for C=false.
Let PLLC be the (syntactic) theory
PLL+mM#(C#M),
where C is an arbitrary but fixed proposition, and MC the class of (antisymmetric)
Kripke constraint models validating PLLC. We might call these the Curry models
for constraint C. The PLLC interpretation of m provides us with a class of models
for which the axiom schemata cmfalse and m(M 6N )#(mM 6 mN ) are
unsound, in general. The former is valid iff <ccC.
Proposition 6.1. MC is characterized by the frame conditions (i) \w. _u. w Rm u
and u < C, and (ii) \w, u. (w < C and w Rm u) O w=u.
Strictly speaking, the two conditions are not pure frame conditions as they
involve the validity of C and thus the valuation. By characterized we mean that the
class of models satisfying the given conditions is the largest class of models for
PLLC closed under any change of valuation that does not modify the validity of C.
Proof. The first condition says that from every world w there is a C-validating
world reachable via Rm . This is necessary and sufficient to ensure validity of
(C#M)#mM (for necessity put M=C ). The second condition says that if w
already validates C then w is a terminal with respect to Rm . This is necessary and
sufficient to ensure the other direction mM#(C#M) (for necessity put M=A,
where A is a propositional constant not occurring in C ). K
With the semantic characterization at hand we can now try to construct concrete
models for PLLC. Let M=(W, Ri , V ) be an arbitrary intuitionistic Kripke model
for IPC. We obtain a suitable constraint Kripke model MC=(W C, RCi , R
C
m , V
C, F C)
by the following definitions:
v W C=W _ [=] where = is a new element not already in W,
v V C(A)=V(A) _ [=],
v F C=[=],
v w RCi v iff w Ri v or v==,
v w RCm v iff M, w <3 C and v==, or w=v.
Thus, the model MC is obtained from M by adding a single fallible element = and
connecting all worlds not satisfying C to it, via Rm . It is not hard to verify that MC
fulfills the requirements of a constraint Kripke model, in particular that RCm is a
reflexive and transitive subrelation of RCi . Moreover, one checks that M
C has the
properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6.1. Thus, M C is a model of PLLC. Note that
the models MC actually are a rather restricted subclass of MC satisfying the
stronger property that if w{v, then w Rm v iff M C, w <3 C and v # F.
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Proposition 6.2 (Curry Models). PLLC is complete for the class of MC models
and, a fortiori, for the class of models satisfying the frame condition of Proposi-
tion 6.1.
Proof. Let formula M be given such that for all intuitionistic Kripke models M,
MC < M. Since MC validates the axioms mK#C#K, we get MC < M C, where
MC is obtained from M by replacing all occurrences of sub-formulas mK by C#K.
But now MC is a modal-free formula for which validity in MC and M coincide.
Thus, M < MC, for all intuitionistic models M. Then, by completeness of IPC,
there is a derivation of MC in IPC. Since IPC is a subcalculus of PLL we have
|&PLL MC. From this, by extensionality of PLL it is easy to conclude that
PLL+mM#(C#M) derives M. K
On might wonder whether PLL proper is complete for the class of all Curry
models, i.e., for M=C MC . This is not the case. For instance, the axiom scheme
(mM#mN )#m(M#N ) is valid in M but is not a theorem of PLL (see the
counter model in Fig. 3). So, there is more to say about constraints than what is
covered by the Curry contexts. Intuitively, Curry’s constraint interpretation
mM#C#M involves a ‘‘positive’’ constraint C: ‘‘if C then M.’’ But what about the
‘‘negative’’ version ‘‘if not C then M ’’? It is, of course, intuitionistically not the same
as ‘‘if cC then M,’’ whence it cannot be reduced to the positive version with a
negated constraint. We need a new constraint context, and in fact this negative
constraint can be formalized by the axiom mM#(C6 M). Let
PLLC :=PLL+mM#(C 6M),
where again C is fixed, and let MC be the class of (antisymmetric) Kripke con-
straint models validating PLLC . Then we get the following result:
Proposition 6.3.
v MC is characterized by the frame conditions (i) \w. w < C O _u. w Rm u and
u # F, and (ii) \w, u. (w <3 C and w Rm u) O w=u, and
v PLLC is complete for this class of models.
Proof. The first frame condition says that from every world w validating C a
fallible world is accessible via Rm . This is necessary and sufficient for validity of
(C 6 M)#mM (for necessity put M=false). The second condition says that if w
does not validate C then it is a terminal with respect to Rm . This is necessary and
sufficient to ensure the other direction mM#(C 6M) (for necessity put M=A
where A is a pc not occurring in C ).
The argument for completeness proceeds along similar lines as for PLLC. By
adjoining a single new fallible node = one constructs for every intuitionistic Kripke
model M a constraint model MC such that for w{v, w RCm v iff M, w < C and
v==. This model is constructed to satisfy the frame condition and the condition
that for modal-free K, MC , w < K iff M, w < K. The rest is as in the proof of
Proposition 6.2, where instead of MC we take MC obtained from M by replacing
every occurrence of a sub-formula mK by C 6K. K
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The reader may check that this second constraint interpretation of m provides
us with a class of models in which the axiom scheme m(M 6N )#(mM 6 mN )
is always valid, while cmfalse is strongly incompatible in the sense that if we add
it to PLLC then mM#M becomes derivable. Furthermore, the axiom scheme
(mM#mN )#m(M#N ) is invalid. It is equivalent to the axiom C 6 cC, i.e., to
the assumption that constraint C is ‘‘classical,’’ in which case C 6 M#cC#M, so
that the positive and negative constraint contexts are interdefinable.
The last interpretation we wish to consider is given by the theory
PLL* :=PLL+mM#((M#false)#false),
in which mM can be read as ‘‘M holds classically.’’ Notice that PLL* contains
the axioms cmfalse and (mM#mN )#m(M#N ), but not m(M 6 N )#
(mM 6 mN ).
Proposition 6.4.
v PLL* is sound and complete for the class of constraint models satisfying
Rm=Ri and F=<.
Proof. Soundness is easy to verify. For completeness we exploit completeness of
IPC as before. Given an intuitionistic Kripke model M=(W, Ri , V) we consider
the constraint model M* obtained from M by taking Rm=Ri and F=<. Then,
M < M iff M* < M* where M* is obtained from M by replacing all occurrences
of m by double negation. K
One might wonder in which sense mM#ccM is a constraint interpretation, or
more precisely what notion of constraint is involved in the statement ‘‘M holds
classically.’’ The answer is simple, the constraint is the Excluded Middle (or some
equivalent classical principle):
Proposition 6.5. Let M be a formula of IPC and pcs(M) the set of propositional
constants in M. Then
ccM#\\ A # pcs(M) A 6cA+#M+
is a theorem of IPC.
Proof. One can construct a derivation verifying the statement by induction on
M. Alternatively, one uses the fact that IPC is complete for the class of finite intui-
tionistic Kripke models (see, e.g., (Dummett, 1977)) and shows that on finite
models the equivalence is valid semantically. K
Proposition 6.5 implies that the theory of mM#ccM is equivalent to the
theory of mM#((A # pcs(M) A 6cA)#M), orin second-order propositional
logicto the theory
mM#(\p. p 6 cp)#M.
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In other words, PLL* is a constraint interpretation of m of the Currian form
PLLC, where the constraint C is of second-order nature.
7. TWO CONCRETE CLASSES OF CONSTRAINT MODELS
In this section we present two concrete classes of constraint models that arise
naturally in hardware verification. In both cases the modality m is interpreted to
express truth up to stabilization constraints. They are obtained from the dynamic
behaviour of combinational circuits under explicit modelling of propagation delays,
so that mM means there exists a timing constraint d such that the circuit stabilizes
in state M after time delay d. The two types of models represent two different
ways of formalizing this idea. The first one, discussed in Section 7.1, is related to
the intermediate logic of Maksimova (1986) and the second one, which will
be discussed in Section 7.2, is related to an intermediate logic due to Kolmogorov
and Medvedev (Medvedev, 1966).
7.1. Combinational Circuits I
The standard way of interpreting propositional logic on circuits is to associate
propositional constants with input and output signals of combinational gates, so
that the truth values correspond to high and low voltages. The PLL models to be
investigated in this section are set up such that for a propositional constant A
A
cA
mA
mcA= means {
A is stable high
A is stable low
A is going to stabilize to high
A is going to stabilize to low
In this way we wish to retain the ideal static interpretation of truth values while
safely keeping track of the offset to the real signals caused by propagation delays.
Formally, signals may be conceived as Boolean-valued functions over the time
domain N of natural numbers, the Boolean values B being denoted by 1 and 0.
A circuit interpretation of PLL then is given by a map I, called a timing diagram,
assigning to each propositional constant A a function I(A): N  B.
Given a timing diagram I we will construct a constraint model M(I), so that
the induced semantics for PLL complies with the informal reading of formulas
given above. The worlds of M(I) are closedopen time intervals obtained from
breaking the signal waveform I into pieces. We adopt a Leibnizian view of time
which takes the process of time to be given by events, i.e., state changes. This means
that the only intervals we can form for a given I are the [s, t), where both s and
t mark a signal change. A time t+1 marks a signal change if there exists A such
that I(A)(t){I(A)(t+1). Let us call these intervals the Leibniz intervals of I. As
special cases of Leibniz intervals [s, t) we allow s, t=0, t= and empty intervals
with s=t. An example can be seen in Fig. 4. It depicts two signals I(A) and I(B)
with their signal changes at times t0=0, t1 , ..., t7 . The Leibniz intervals, then, are
[ti , tj), and [ti , ), i, j=0, ..., 7, i j.
24 FAIRTLOUGH AND MENDLER
File: 643J 262725 . By:XX . Date:04:08:01 . Time:10:00 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 2554 Signs: 1567 . Length: 52 pic 10 pts, 222 mm
FIG. 4. An example interpretation.
Given a timing diagram I, a constraint model
M(I) =
df
(W(I), Ri (I), Rm(I), V(I), F(I))
is constructed as follows:
v W(I) is the set of Leibniz intervals for I
v [s, t) Ri (I) [s$, t$) if [s$, t$) is a subinterval of [s, t)
v [s, t) Rm(I) [s$, t$) if [s$, t$) is a final subinterval of [s, t), i.e., t=t$ and
ss$
v [s, t) # V(I)(A) if I(A) is constant 1 throughout [s, t), i.e., \x. sx<t,
I(A)(x)=1
v F(I) is the set of empty intervals [s, s).
The set W(I) is clearly nonempty, as it always contains the pairs [0, 0) and
[0, ). The other properties of a constraint Kripke model are easily verified. Also,
as this model is confluent, it satisfies the axiom m(M 6 N )#(mM 6 mN ). Let us
write I < M instead of M(I) < M from now on.
Proposition 7.1. Let A be an atomic proposition.
v I < A iff I(A) is constant 1.
v I < cA iff I(A) is constant 0.
v I < mA iff I(A) stabilizes eventually to 1, i.e., there is a ks such that
\xk. I(A)(x)=1.
v I < mcA iff I(A) stabilizes eventually to 0.
Proof. Easy. K
Thus, the semantics of the basic modalities is as anticipated at the beginning of
this section. In particular, we notice that in this interpretation the intuitionistic
nature of PLL is intimately tied up with transient behaviour: I < A 6cA iff
I(A) is stable.
In analyzing the meaning of formulas it is helpful to realize that t< implies
[s, t) < mM for any M, i.e., finite intervals validate any m-formula. This is a
consequence of the fact that from finite intervals there is always the empty final
subinterval reachable through Rm(I). Intuitively, a finite Leibniz interval does not
25PROPOSITIONAL LAX LOGIC
File: 643J 262726 . By:DS . Date:06:08:01 . Time:09:30 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 3231 Signs: 2388 . Length: 52 pic 10 pts, 222 mm
carry stability information, as it represents an intermediate phase of the circuit’s
execution.
With this in mind we may unroll the semantics of some formulas to find that we
can express various types of stabilization behaviour:
Proposition 7.2. Let A, B be propositional constants.
v I < m(A 6 cA) iff I(A) stabilizes eventually.
v I < cmfalse iff all signals are constant in I.
v I < (A 6 cA)#mfalse iff I(A) oscillates indefinitely.
v I < mA#cB iff whenever I(B) switches to 1 all signals have become stable
for good and I(A) rests at 0.
Proof. Easy. K
It can be seen that if the circuit stabilizes completely at some time s, then both
I, [s, ) < A 6cA and I, [s, ) < mA#A for all A. Thus, after stabilization,
the theory reduces to ordinary classical Boolean algebra, which is what one expects.
We might specify the falling output transition of an invertor by the formula
A#mcB, ‘‘if I(A) becomes stable 1 for good then eventually I(B) becomes
stable 0 for good.’’ Similarly, cA#mB would capture the rising output transition.
Given this axiomatization we might consider a ring circuit consisting of an odd
number of invertors. Then, if A represents any one of the signals within the ring our
logic would derive the formula (A#mcA) 7 (cA#mA) which says precisely
that I(A) oscillates. This is much closer to the behaviour of the real circuit than
the classical theory of the invertor ring leading to A#cA, which is plainly incon-
sistent.
One can show that the m-free fragment also allows us to specify nontrivial
dynamic behaviour: it is possible to specify state and transition invariants, say that
two signals may never be 1 at the same time, or in a certain state never switch at
the same time.
Let us call the theory induced by the circuit models M(I), for arbitrary timing
diagrams I, Circuit-PLL. Now, in view of its nontrivial expressibility it is natural
to ask whether one can find a (finite) complete axiomatization for Circuit-PLL.
Though some axioms are known this question remains open at the time of writing.
The following axiom schemes are valid in (but not complete for) Circuit-PLL:
v m(M6 N )#(mM 6 mN )
v cmfalse#(M 6 cM)
v ( ( (L # M 6N ) # M 6 N ) 7 ( (M # L 6N ) # L 6N ) 7 ((N # L 6 M) #
L 6 M))#L 6 M6 N
v ((ccM#M)#M 6 cM)#cM6 ccM
v ccA#A for propositional constants A.
The first axiom scheme has been noted before and stems from the confluence of
both accessibility relations in the circuit models. The second axiom scheme we have
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encountered implicitly in the semantic discussions above. It shows how m depends
upon the fallible nature of the models: if the axiom cmfalse excluding fallible
nodes is added, Circuit-PLL becomes equivalent to classical propositional logic.
Thus, although its semantics involves time the modal operator m is rather different
from a temporal operator such as ‘‘eventually.’’ The third axiom scheme is Gabbay
and DeJongh’s binary tree formula D1 (Gabbay and DeJongh, 1974) and fourth
Scott’s axiom (Kreisel and Putnam, 1957). Both follow directly from the structure
of the circuit models’ accessibility relation Ri (I). The last axiom is easy to verify;
it reflects the stability of the truth valuation for propositional constants. Note that
this axiom does not hold as a scheme since for instance cc(A 6B)#A 6B is not
valid. This means that Circuit-PLL is a nonstandard logic, i.e., not closed under
substitution. We might point out that this feature, of not being closed under sub-
stitution, parallels the characteristics of dynamic systems. The functional behaviour
of an asynchronous circuit, for instance, is not preserved when substituting a com-
posite circuit for a functionally equivalent primitive subcomponent. Replacing a
multi-input AND gate by a cascade of 2-input ANDs, say, may introduce critical
hazards that corrupt the functional operation.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the m-free fragment of Circuit-PLL, i.e., the
intuitionistic base of Circuit-PLL, deserves some attention in itself. For it coincides
with the regular form of Maksimova’s intermediate logic L6 (Maksimova, 1986),
more precisely we have
m-free Circuit-PLL=L6+[ccA#A | A propositional constant].
This follows from the fact that both theories are generated by essentially by the
same class of Kripke models, viz., finite nonempty sequences of bit-vectors. For
L6+[ccA#A] this can be deduced from the definition of L6 and the
semantics of the regularity axioms ccA#A. For Circuit-PLL this can be seen as
follows. We first observe that in the m-free fragment we can restrict ourselves to
finite timing diagrams, i.e., those with a finite number of signals which all eventually
stabilize: a m-free formula is valid iff it is valid in all finite timing diagrams. We can
then further simplify the interpretation noting that validity does not depend on the
absolute length of an interval. Thus, we may identify a finite timing diagram over
n pcs with its underlying sequence of n-bit states. For instance, the finite interval
[t2 , t6) in Fig. 4 corresponds to the state sequence 01, 11, 10, 11 where the first bit
corresponds to propositional constant A and the second to B. Since the validity of
formulas in the m-free fragment is unaffected by the presence of empty intervals, we
may as well restrict ourselves to non-empty sequences. This shows that the models
for m-free Circuit-PLL can be reduced to nonempty finite sequences of bit-vectors.
This observation leads to a simple proof of the following:
Proposition 7.3. m-free Circuit-PLL, or regular L6, is decidable.
Proof. Let 7+ denote the set of all non-empty sequences of n-bit vectors and for
two such sequences w, v, let wC=v if there exist v1 , v2 , possibly empty, such that
v=v1 wv2 . Now to every formula M whose propositional constants are among
p1 , ..., pn we may assign a subset M of 7+ in the following way:
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true=7+
 false=<
pi=[s0s1 } } } sm # 7+ | \jm. (sj)(i)=1]
M 7 N=M & N
M 6 N=M _ N
M#N=[w # 7+ | \uC=w. u # M O u # N]
cM=[w # 7+ | \u C=w. u  M].
It is straightforward to show that for every timing diagram I and every formula
M, I # M iff I < M; it is almost as straightforward to show that M is a
regular language, from which decidability follows immediately. K
7.2. Combinational Circuits II
We now discuss a second type of constraint models for combinational circuits
that uses m to account for propagation delays. In contrast to the previous model
we will now distinguish between signal values and truth values. A propositional
constant A represents an atomic statement about the stabilization behaviour of an
associated signal a. For a Boolean signal a there are two atomic statements we are
interested in: ‘‘a is stable high,’’ which may be written a=1, and ‘‘a is stable low,’’
written a=0. In this vein, we assume that the propositional constants of PLL are
of the form a=1 or a=0 where a ranges over a countably infinite number of
signals S=[a, b, c, c1 , c2 , ...]. A timing diagram, now, is a function V: S  N  B
that maps every signal a # S to a function V(a): N  B. We will interpret PLL over
sets of timing diagrams rather than single timing diagrams. More precisely, a circuit
in this section is conceived as a time-invariant subset CS  N  B. Here C is
called time invariant if CdC for all d # N, where Cd is obtained from C by shifting
all V # C left by an amount of d. Formally, we define Vd such that Vd(a)(t)=
V(a)(t+d ), and then Cd=[Vd | V # C]. Each element V # C represents a possible
waveform for C, called an observable behaviour, or execution, of C.
Given the circuit C, a constraint Kripke model
M(C ) =df (W(C), Ri (C), Rm(C ), V(C ), F(C ))
is constructed as follows:
vW(C ) is the set of pairs (D, s) where DC is time invariant and s # N
v (D, s) Ri (C) (E, t) if ED and ts
v (D, s) Rm(C) (E, t) if E=D and ts
v (D, s) # V(C)(a=1) if for all V # D, V(a) stabilizes to 1 before time s, i.e.,
\xs. V(a)(x)=1
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v (D, s) # V(C)(a=0) if for all V # D, V(a) stabilizes to 0 before time s, i.e.,
\xs. V(a)(x)=0
v F(C )=[(<, s) | s # N].
The set W(C ) is clearly nonempty, and the other properties of a constraint
Kripke model are easily verified, too. Note also that this model is confluent, i.e., it
satisfies the axiom m(M 6 N )#(mM6 mN ). Furthermore one checks that
cmfalse is valid as well, which suggests that fallible worlds are redundant in this
model. In fact, they could be removed without changing the semantics of formulas,
but keeping the empty sets is technically convenient.
The constraint models M(C ) induce an interesting semantics of bounded
stabilization for PLL. Let us write C < M instead of M(C) < M to denote validity
with respect to this class of models. Propositional constants are atomic stabilization
predicates: C < a=i states that signal a is constant i in all executions V # C. It will
be useful to introduce (a=i)a (V, t) as an abbreviation for the semantic stabiliza-
tion condition \xt. V(a)(x)=i. If A is a propositional constant, then (D, s) < A
is the same as \V # D. Aa(V, s).
Proposition 7.4. Let A, B be propositional constants. Then, C < A#mB iff
there exists d # N such that for all V # C and t # N, Aa(V, t) implies Ba(V, t+d ).
Proof. C < A#mB is equivalent to (C, 0) < A#mB since (C, 0) is the least
element in M(C ). Unrolling the semantical definitions this is equivalent to
\DC. \t0. (\V # D. Aa(V, t)) O (_dt. \V # D. Ba(V, d )), (1)
where D is time-invariant. In particular consider the time-invariant subset
D*=[V # C | Aa(V, 0)] of C, so that \V # D*. Aa(V, 0) is trivially true. If we
instantiate D in (1) by D* and t by 0, then (1) reduces to _d0. \V # D*. Ba(V, d),
which is the same as _d. \V # C. Aa(V, 0) O Ba(V, d ). Making use of the time
invariance of C this finally gives us
_d. \V # C. \t # N. Aa(V, t) O Ba(V, t+d ). (2)
The converse can be shown too, viz., that (2) implies (1). K
Thus, a formula such as a=1#m(b=1) comes down to a boundedly-gives-rise-
to statement: ‘‘there exists a stabilization bound d such that whenever a becomes
stable 1, b will become stable 1 with a maximal delay d.’’ More generally, A#mB
specifies a bounded transition from A to B. Note that the ordering of quantifiers in
the statement of Proposition 7.4 is crucial: _d \V means that the delay d is a
uniform bound for all executions of C. In contrast, swapping the quantifiers to
\V _d would permit the delay to depend on the particular execution, and in par-
ticular to be unbounded over all V # C. We may call d a uniform stabilization bound
for the transition A#mB and \V # C. \t # N. Aa(V, t) O Ba(V, t+d ) the stabiliza-
tion refinement of A#mB by d. More formally, we may introduce
(A#mB)a (V, d ) as an abbreviation for \t. Aa(V, t) O Ba(V, t+d ). With this nota-
tion we may restate Proposition 7.4 as follows: C < A#mB iff there exists a
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stabilization bound d # N such that for all V # C, the stabilization refinement
(A#mB)a (V, d ) is true. We omit the proof of
Proposition 7.5. Let A1 , A2 , B1 , B2 be propositional constants. Then
C < (A1#mB1)#(A2#mB2) iff there exists f : N  N such that for all V # C and
d # N, (A1#mB1)a (V, d ) implies (A2#mB2)a (V, f d ).
It turns out that the structure brought up by Propositions 7.4 and 7.5 can be lif-
ted to arbitrary formulas. One can assign to every formula M of PLL a set M
of stabilization bounds and for every d # M construct a stabilization refinement
Ma(V, d ) of M by d. It can be shown that in this way an equivalent characterization
of the Kripke constraint models introduced in this section can be obtained, viz.,
that C < M iff there exists a d # M such that Ma(V, d ) is true for all V # C. This
refinement semantics can be viewed essentially as a set-theoretic realizability seman-
tics for PLL, which can be used for the extraction of data-dependent timing infor-
mation (Mendler, 1996; Mendler and Fairtlough, 1996).
To finish this section let us mention some distinguished special situations con-
tained in this type of constraint models. First we notice that if C=[V] consists of
a single constant execution V (i.e., one in which all signals are constant), then
validity coincides with ordinary classical validity. Such C satisfies the axioms
M6 cM and mM#M, and we have C < M iff M is classically valid for V, where
an atomic sentence a=i, is read as ‘‘signal a is constant i.’’ This special case
corresponds to the usual static two-valued model of circuits.
Another way in which the classical two-valued reasoning can be embedded into
the semantics is the following one: as one verifies readily, for arbitrary C,
C < ccM iff M is classically valid on all V # C, where a=i is read as ‘‘signal a
will stabilize to i.’’ This means that double negated formulas are classical statements
about the stationary state of a circuit. To be more precise, these are classical
statements in a three-valued setting in which a signal a can be stable 1, stable 0, or
oscillate. The latter value is represented by the formula c(a=1) 7 c(a=0). If C
is a circuit in which all signals eventually stabilize, then C < cc(a=1 6 a=0)
and we get back, under double negation, the classical two-valued model of the final
stable state.
A third interesting special case are the constant circuits C consisting of an
arbitrary subset of constant executions. In such circuits the time dimension is com-
pletely eliminated and mM is equivalent to M. Assuming that we are interested in
the validity of formulas containing an arbitrary but fixed finite number of signals
a1 , a2 , ..., an , every execution V # C can be reduced to a finite vector V # Bn in the
apparent way. Thus, every constant circuit C can be identified with a subset CBn
of Boolean vectors. Validity in the set of all constant circuits then coincides with
ordinary intuitionistic validity in the lattice Ln=(^(Bn), $) with regular valua-
tions and < as fallible element. A valuation is regular if for all propositional con-
stants A and DBn, D < A iff \V # D. [V] < A. The regular intuitionistic theory
of the lattices Ln (with < fallible), and hence the theory of all constant circuits, can
be shown to coincide with Medvedev’s intermediate logic of singleton problems
(Medvedev, 1966). A complete axiomatization for Medvedev’s singleton problems
has been given by (Miglioli et al., 1989), where the theory is called Fcl .
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8. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new viewpoint on a little-explored intuitionistic modal
logic, PLL, which is a conservative extension of the standard intuitionistic proposi-
tional calculus by a single modal operator m. We show that, besides representing
a notion of ‘‘local truth’’ or playing a role as the type theory of the computational
*-calculus, m can be used to capture the notion of ‘‘correctness-up-to-constraints.’’
The advantage of the framework we present here is that it provides a precise defini-
tion of constraint correctness that permits more or less arbitrary instantiation while
enjoying an intriguing yet tractable meta-theory.
The main result is that PLL has a natural class of two-frame Kripke models for
which it is sound and complete, and moreover the finite model property holds. This
provides a satisfactory model-theoretic account of the modality m in an intui-
tionistic setting. In particular, the Kripke models allow us to establish an embed-
ding of PLL in a classical bimodal theory that extends Go del’s translation. On the
proof-theoretic side it is shown that PLL, despite being a modal logic, inherits
many of the properties of intuitionistic logic, viz., deduction theorem, a simple cut-
free sequent calculus, the disjunction property, and strong extensionality.
We have given a number of concrete models for PLL, two of them motivated
from hardware verification. In these we interpret PLL over timing diagrams in two
different ways such that m expresses truth up to stabilization. The first of these
models is related to Maksimova’s logic L6 and the second to Medvedev’s inter-
mediate constructive logic of singleton problems. We have used our characterisa-
tion of the first model to find a simple proof of the decidability of the regular form
of L6.
For circuits where delays do not invalidate functional correctness, such as syn-
chronous circuits, it is often necessary or advantageous to combine functional and
timing analysis so as to derive the exact data-dependent delay of combinational cir-
cuitry. We believe that PLL can be used to do this with standard proof extraction
techniques based on a concrete computational lambda calculus as mentioned in the
introduction. The applicability of PLL to hardware verification and constraint
handling still deserves to be explored in more detail. The first results obtained by
the authors, however, are very promising indeed.
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